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Summary findings
An important  objective of public spending is to raise  Benefit incidence studies ignore behavioral responses
household living standards, particularly for the poor. But  and second-round effects, and simply use the cost of
how can final impacts on this objective best be assessed?  provision as a proxy for benefits received. Behavioral
Evaluating a policy's impact requires assessing how  approaches present quite different drawbacks, in
different things would have been in its absence. But the  attempting to represent individual benefits correctly.
counterfactual of no intervention is often tricky to  A number of recent studies usefully combine both
quantify.  approaches.
Van de Walle surveys the methods most often used to  It is still uncertain whether behaviorally consistent
assess the welfare effects of public spending. In studying  methods actually point to fundamentally different policy
the current state of the art she identifies some limitations  recommendations. What can be concluded is that we
of current practices and draws implications for best  need to diversify and compare results from our
practice in future work. The methods used to assess  evaluation methods and broaden our definition of well-
welfare impacts broadly fall into two groups: benefit  being, to see how various facets of living standards are
incidence studies and behavioral approaches.  Both have  affected by public spending.
their strengths and weaknesses.
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The role of government  is to enhance  social welfare.  One way to achieve this is by
spending  on things of value to people which they cannot otherwise  attain.  Priority should  be
given to things that the private sector cannot or will not spend on, or that the private sector
tends to under-provide. One of those things is equity.  While most of us would prefer to see
less inequality  and poverty, individually  we do not have much of an incentive  to do something
about it, since a large share of the benefits go to others.  Thus, there can be an important  case
for public intervention  to help improve distributional  outcomes. Public spending  is a
potentially  powerful instrument-and the main instrument  available  to governments  in
developing  countries-for  fighting poverty.  But budgets  are limited.  Other things will be
underprovided  without  public action.  So governments  face competing  demands, and intense
scrutiny  of whether desirable  distributional  objectives  are indeed being met by expenditure
practices.  Economists  and policymakers  therefore need to be able to evaluate the distributional
impacts  of public spending  policies.
This paper aims to provide a critical, though selective, overview  of the current state of
practice in empirically assessing  the welfare impacts  of public spending. I assume that we are
interested  in assessing impacts  on levels of some welfare indicator, and that greater weight is
attached to people who are poorer in terms of that indicator. The assessment  is thus concerned
with inequality  as well as with the average  level of living. The aim is to give an overview  of
the main methods used, to discuss  some of the key issues that have been raised about those
methods and to see what all this means for policy.
1Before tackling  the question of how to measure the distributional  effects of public
spending, it is necessary  to establish  criteria by which  performance  will be assessed.
Specifying  the welfare objective-and why confusion about the welfare objective is often an
obstacle  to determining  policy impacts-are the issues delved into in the paper's next section.
This is followed  by a discussion  of common  approaches  to measuring  distributional  impacts.
The limitations  and strengths  of "benefit  incidence  studies" and of "behavioral  approaches"  are
explored  with an emphasis  on what they can and cannot tell us and how confident we can be in
drawing policy implications. Recent studies which wed the two methods are also reviewed.
The conclusion  offers a brief summing  up.
How Should  We Judge  Welfare  Outcomes?
We can agree that the primary concern is with impacts  of public spending on welfare.
At one level, this seems uncontentious  and straightforward. But in putting this objective into
practice we quickly get into conceptual  distinctions  which may ultimately  influence  the
judgements  made about policy impacts. Although  we may concur that human "welfare" is the
objective, we may disagree about what that means.
Difficulties  arise because there are multiple dimensions  to welfare, and not all people
adhere to the same concept. Views differ on the weight  to assign different  facets of well-
being.  Three general conceptualizations  of welfare have been proposed: (i) utility, (ii) income
and (iii) capability. Under the utility (or "welfarist")  paradigm, individual  utilities are the sole
objective  of policy.'  Only individual  preferences  carry any weight and individual  preferences
are typically  tied to both income and leisure.  The "income"  dimension  is sometimes
2interpreted as the monetary equivalent  of utility where, for example, leisure is valued and
added to other income. Alternatively,  it is a distinct view where conmnand  over commodities
is deemed  to be the sole objective. More recently, the "capabilities"  framework argues that
welfare should  be assessed  by the attainment  of certain basic capabilities,  such as avoiding
hunger and illiteracy (Sen 1985).
Three observations  help illustrate  why the multidimensionality  of well-being, and the
various views on what it means to be poor, complicate  welfare assessments  of policy impacts.
First, even within a particular  concept of welfare, there are likely to be important  differences
in how it is measured. For example, the methods  of aggregating  information  on individual
welfare impacts into a single summary  statistic, such as an index of poverty can be contentious.
How poverty is measured-the  choice of the specific  living standards indicator, the poverty
cutoff point and the poverty index used-can  all influence  policy assessments  (see Ravallion
1994).  And even when there is agreement  on the poverty measure, disagreements  can still
arise in how to assess policy options. For instance,  some (Grosh 1995, Cornia and Stewart
1995 are examples)  judge a policy by how well it concentrates  benefits on the poor, so as to
avoid errors in targeting (both errors in leakage  to the non-poor  and errors of imperfect
coverage of the poor).  Yet others, starting from the same objective of reducing  income
poverty, argue that the policy which has the greatest impact  on poverty is not necessarily  the
one with the lowest errors of targeting-deliberate "errors" may well enhance  the final impact
on poverty by avoiding  costs often associated  with fine targeting (Ravallion  and Datt 1995).
Second, it is rarely a case of choosing  between one conceptualization  or the other.
Policy choice in practice is constrained  by the availability  of instruments  and influenced  by a
3multiplicity  of objectives. For example, interventions  may target benefits exclusively  to
women for a variety of reasons. We may believe that women are more disadvantaged  than
men, or we may believe that there are positive externalities  accruing to others as a result of
targeting women (Appleton  and Collier 1995). Similarly,  as a way of raising incomes many
support public spending  on education  because of its impact  on productivity. The fact that
education  may also raise utility and capabilities-independently  of incomes-is  surely also
worthy of consideration  in our assessment  of the policy against an alternative  use of the funds.
A third observation  is that while economists  generally  assume that utilities are the
objective  of policy (as well as of individual  behavior), policymakers  often focus more on non-
utility concepts of welfare such as income-narrowly defined as command  over
commodities-or attainments  in health and education. For example, policymakers  concerned
about reducing  poverty do not typically  consider the poor's leisure, or how hard they must
work; even though there are costs to utility, they are not debited against  gains in raising money
income. Yet, so many of our rules-of-thumb  derive from the utility framework. Certain
consequences  of this perspective for common  targeting  and evaluation rules are illustrated  by
Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala (1994).  They show that if the policy objective is the minimization
of an income-based  poverty index, widely  accepted  rules-of-thumb  based on the utility
framework-namely that marginal tax rates on the poor should be low-are  overturned. Under
the alternative  policy goal, simulated  optimal  marginal tax rates tend to be 60 percent or more
(given minimal revenue requirements).
Another illustration is found in a study of the labor supply effects of Sri Lanka's food
stamp scheme (Sahn and Alderman 1995). The study finds that the scheme  resulted in both
4men and women reducing  their hours worked. Is this a good or bad outcome? That depends
on one's welfare objective. If leisure is accorded  a high weight, the policy may be considered
a success. Parents may be spending  more time with their children or they may be better off
due to increased  leisure time.  But the policymaker  trying to achieve  the greatest dent in
income poverty for a given budget may consider such behavioral  responses  costly.  The same
impact on income may have been achieved  through  a different policy at lower cost.  Clearly,
therefore, policy evaluation  may depend on the underlying  objective.
Consensus  has not been reached on these choices. Indeed, disagreements  are likely to
persist.  Given this state of affairs there is a need to recognize  that there are multiple
dimensions  for judging policy impacts  which cannot be easily aggregated into a widely
acceptable  measure.  The message that underlying  assumptions  about welfare and poverty
measurement  influence  the evaluation  of public spending  programs should  be kept firmly in
mind.  This speaks to the need for clarity about those assumptions,  and a recognition  of how
sensitive  policy conclusions  can be to changes in those assumptions.
How Can  We Assess the  Welfare  Impacts  of Public  Spending?
Past endeavors  to measure the welfare impact  of public spending  programs can be
categorized  into two general approaches.  "Benefit  incidence  studies" and "behavioral
approaches". The following  discussion  briefly describes  each approach in order to draw out
their strengths  and limitations. Recent studies which  blend the two approaches  are then
examined.
5Benefit Incidence Studies
Benefit incidence studies assume that the value to consumers  of a public service can be
identified  by the cost of providing it.  They then assign  benefits to the users of the service
ranked by some agreed measure of current welfare.  This provides a profile of the distribution
of the specific  category of public spending  across the distribution  of the chosen welfare
indicator. There are various ways of presenting  the results which allow one to determine
whether the public spending  component  is progressive (inequality  reducing)  or regressive
(inequality  increasing);  and whether it appears to be a good way to transfer benefits to the poor
compared  to other public spending  components. An example is given by Figure 1 which shows
how the benefits (in absolute  monetary amounts)  from spending  on primary and tertiary
education  are distributed  across income per capita groups ranked from poorest to richest for
Tunisia in 1990 (Republic  of Tunisia 1993). Results can be further dissagregated-for example
across regional, gender and ethnic groups.
Benefit incidence  studies divulge  nothing about why incidence  outcomes  are what they
are.  For this reason the policy implications  are limited and general, rather than specific.  In
reality, a number of factors conspire to produce the distributional  outcomes.  The variables
determining  the supply of, and the demand for, the public good or service, and how these vary
across the distribution  of living standards  matter.  For example, primary education is often
found to be progressive  because the poor (as defined by per capita income or consumption)
tend to have more primary-school-age  children. Further analysis  of the underlying causes is
often necessary in order to draw policy implications.
6Benefit incidence  studies have been around a long time.  In the World Bank  the twin
studies by Meerman (1979) on Malaysia  and by Selowsky  (1979)  on Colombia were very
influential. Some  governments  also routinely  carry out incidence  studies, particularly in Latin
America (e.g. Flood et al. 1995 for Argentina). Chile's household  survey, CASEN, was
designed with social sector benefit incidence  analysis in mind.
The principle of benefit incidence  studies is relatively straightforward. In practice,
however, assembling  the method's building  blocks can be quite onerous.  Simply ranking
individuals  correctly can be difficult. The data on utilization  may be faulty, or not integrated
with data on the welfare measure used.  And piecing together  the unit cost data-particularly  in
decentralized  systems where funding  may occur at various levels of government  and there is no
central accounting  process-can be a nightmare.
On the positive side, the methodology  is readily understood,  the results easily presented
and-especially when conmmunicated  graphically-they can be extremely  powerful. The
government  may not have stopped  to ponder the social welfare function implied  by its spending
policies.  And even if it has, benefit incidence  results may be a surprise to policy-makers. A
benefit incidence  study can be an influential  tool in bringing home messages  of the need for
budget reallocations  and reform.
Benefit incidence  studies have had a great deal of influence  in development  policy.
Many current policy recommnendations  are based on such studies. For example, the case for
expanding  the share of public spending  on basic services-notably primary and secondary
education  and basic health care-is  often based on benefit incidence  studies. Such spending  is
found to reach the poor almost universally,  while spending  on tertiary services-university
7education, hospital services-is  invariably  shown to be pro-rich by benefit incidence  studies.
(The education  spending  pattern exhibited  in Figure 1 for Tunisia is typical of many countries.)
Aggregate spending  on basic health and education  is invariably  found to be inequality  reducing
though it may still confer lower absolute amounts  to the poor than would a uniform
(untargeted)  transfer.  Benefit incidence  studies also find that certain food based schemes,
social cash transfers, public employment  schemes  and other targeted transfer schemes  have at
times been quite pro-poor, though others have not, despite their pro-poor rhetoric.
SOME  LIMITATIONS  OF BENEFIT  INCIDENCE  STUDIES.  Despite its influence, a
number of concerns have been raised about the benefit incidence  methodology. Some are
serious enough to warrant considerable  care in basing policy recommendations  solely on
evidence from such studies. Perhaps the most common  criticism is that the unit cost of
provision may have little relation  to the value of the benefits to the individual. To take a
simple example, the cost of immunizing  a child is typically  small compared to the lifelong
benefits.
Another limitation  is that benefit incidence  studies give an incomplete  representation  of
the welfare effects of public spending. This point relates back to the multi-dimensionality  of
well-being. Benefit incidence  studies interpret all public spending-whether in cash or in-
kind-in  terms of the monetary transfer equivalent  to see how those transfers alter the
distribution  of income  or consumption. 2 However, we often want to know about impacts on
other dimensions  of living standards. For example, did health status improve as a result of
health sector subsidies? Was the increased  spending  on schools reflected in higher literacy?
8What was the impact  of the school lunch program on nutrition and were there complementary
effects on cognitive  achievements? Policy makers are more often interested  in how well a
social sector policy performed in its intended  effect (eg improved  health status) than in how it
topped off the distribution  of income. One obvious implication  of this line of criticism is that
we should examine a range of impact  measures  and social indicators  and not limit our analyses
to benefit incidence.
A number of important  public goods and services-important in terms of their likely
impact on the poor-are  not amenable  to analysis  by the benefit incidence  methodology  because
it is unusually  difficult  to identify  individual  users or to estimate the unit cost of provision.
Examples include safe water, sanitation,  communicable  disease and vector control and much
physical infrastructure. All too often sector studies conduct benefit incidence  analyses focusing
solely on the spending  for which users can be readily identified. Discussion  of the rest of the
government's  budget-which may contain  public spending  components  with the greatest
consequence  to the poor-falls  through the cracks.  This implies, once again, that benefit
incidence  studies need to be supplemented  by other approaches.
Benefit incidence  studies may not capture some important  second-round  effects on
welfare.  The method tries to identify  direct transfer impacts. Yet, indirect  benefits may be of
considerable  consequence  to the distributional  outcome. For example, while the poor are not
direct beneficiaries  of subsidies  to tertiary education,  the indirect benefits-transmitted through
good governance, the existence  of a class of technocrats,  agricultural  specialists,  good
educators, health personnel, and so on-may  be of significance  to the well-being  and livelihood
of the poor.  Indirect benefits and externalities  are difficult  to estimate  and so little is known
9about their likely magnitude. But if they exist benefit incidence  studies may be shaping  policy
recommendations  which could be seriously flawed  and have unfortunate  consequences  for the
poor.  This does not imply that governments  should (to continue  the same example)  carry on
subsidizing  university  education  for the rich at the expense of even rudimentary  primary
schooling  for the poor.  Rather, it points to being more circumspect  in drawing policy
recommendations. For example, rather than public abandonment  of universities in countries
where there is no private market to take the slack and where markets, and credit markets in
particular, do not work well, there may be room for alternative  approaches. One possibility is
to require a number of years of public service from graduates in repayment  for free education
benefits. 3 The government  of Indonesia, for example, has long required the doctors it trains to
spend some years working in remote rural primary health clinics upon graduation.
Benefit incidence  studies present results on the distribution  of average benefits.  The
marginal  benefits distribution  will often be of equal or greater interest in assessing  public
policy reform.  Average incidence  at one point in time may be a misleading  indicator of the
distribution  of the gains from public spending  (Lipton and Ravallion  1995, section  6.4.3).  A
seemingly  beneficial  expansion  in the primary school budget may be buying better quality for
schools in which the rich are enrolled rather than more public schools for the under-
provisioned  poor.  One way to get at this is to replicate  methodologies  to compare incidence  at
two or more dates with comparable  data to see how spending  changes were distributed  across
different groups.  Two recent studies use this technique  and find that changes  during the 1980s
were pro-poor for Indonesia's public health sector and Malaysia's health and education  sectors
(van de Walle 1994, Hammer  et al. 1995, respectively). Unfortunately  the methodology  is
10unable to account  for the factors underlying incidence  patterns; for example, to what degree
government  policy as opposed  to income growth can be credited with the improvements  in
equity.  In order to draw policy lessons, we ultimately  need to know what accounts for the
favorable outcome.
The Malaysia study supplements  the incidence  analysis  with more detailed analysis of
the underlying mechanisms  (Hammer  et al. 1995). It attributes success in the education sector
to the government's  policy of ethnic targeting, but finds that pro-poor improvements  in the
health sector are due to the private sector's increasing  ability to attract wealthier  households.
This study is a good example of the use of complementary  methods to assess the distributional
impacts  of public spending  policies.
Another  promising avenue  for exploring  the marginal impacts  of public expenditures  is
to use data which follow the same households  or regions over time.  The rising availability  of
such panel data and the econometric  techniques  for using them are paving the way for more
sophisticated  and robust estimation  of distributional  impacts  and the introduction  of dynamic
effects in incidence. Using a panel of Hungarian  households  for 1987 through 1989, Ravallion
et al. (1995) devise a methodology  to examine how well the social safety net protected
households  from falling into poverty versus how well it promoted  households  out of poverty.
Such evidence on dynamic  performance  would seem to be of key value in designing  effective
safety nets.
Perhaps the most damaging  critique of benefit incidence  studies is their assumption
about the world without public spending-the counterfactual. The fundamental  objective of a
benefit incidence  study is to compare the distribution  of welfare with and without  public
11expenditures. Of course, we do not know what things would  be like in the absence of public
spending. So the without-intervention  position is assumed to be the welfare indicator (e.g.
income per capita) less the monetary value of the benefits secured from publicly-provided
goods.  However, from theory and overwhelming  evidence,  we know that public policies affect
individual  economic  behavior, including  labor supply, consumption,  savings and investment
decisions. A household's consumption  pattern and its income depends  on what public goods
and services it expects to receive. We all make our work and savings decisions  based on
whether the government  provides retirement  pensions,  whether we need to save for our
children's education and whether  we feel adequately  protected  in case of a medical emergency
in the family. And, as is well recognized, such household  responses  have potentially  important
implications  for a policy's final impact. Yet, benefit incidence  studies simply ignore behavioral
responses.
There has not been sufficient  careful research to predict how much reranking of
households  would in fact occur if behavioral  responses were factored in.  The above-mentioned
study of Hungary  experiments  with different estimates  of the marginal propensity  to consume
out of social incomes to simulate  the counterfactual  and the consequences  for assessments  of
the performance  of the safety net (Ravallion  et al. 1995). The results indicate that, although
the distribution  changes significantly,  qualitative  conclusions  do not.  Further research needs to
test this in other settings  and circumstances. In the absence of conclusive  evidence  on this
issue, the validity of the conclusions  drawn from benefit incidence  studies must remain
questionable.
12A VERDICT  ON BENEFIT  INCIDENCE  STUDIES?  Where does the foregoing  discussion
of benefit incidence  studies leave us?  Some of the implications  drawn from the studies-such
as that governments  should invest and reallocate  budgets towards  basic services-are
compelling,  partly because they reinforce tenets arising from economic  theory and other
evidence. Such services often fail to attract the private sector and thus accord with the
principle that governments  should  be responsible  for valuable  goods which would otherwise  be
underprovided. Additional  support  comes from recent endogenous  growth theory and a general
consensus  in the development  community  that human resource development  is necessary  for
equitable economic  growth (Bruno  et al. (1996) review the theory and evidence). The fact that
benefit incidence studies show  basic services to be among the best ways to reach the poor
surely clinches it.
Despite their limitations,  benefit incidence  studies can be useful in providing a
rudimentary,  first-cut approximation  and working hypothesis  of how specific  components  of
public spending  are distributed  across key groups of interest.  But, in actually using the results
as endorsement  for policy directions,  much more circumspection  is required than has tended to
be the case.  Before embarking  on fundamental  reform, governments  should validate the policy
implications  with corroborating  evidence  from other sources. A broadening  of the welfare
indicator to cover non-income  facets would also help.  Benefit incidence  results can be useful,
but they do not provide sufficient  information  for charting  the course of pro-poor reforms in
public spending.
Behavioral  Approaches
13The second general approach  to measurement,  here denoted "behavioral  approaches,"
can be interpreted as attempts  to resolve the counterfactual  problem described above by
explicitly  modelling  behavioral  responses. Also in contrast to benefit incidence  studies, this
class of methods is geared to estimating  marginal incidence;  and they can be used to explore
the impacts of public spending  on goods and services for which specific  users cannot be
identified, as well as to determine impacts  on multiple dimensions  of welfare.
Benefits  are valued  using either a monetary or non-monetary  welfare metric consistent
with behavioral responses  to public spending. Compensating  and equivalent variations and
willingness-to-pay  are examples  of the monetary measures  used in practice, while social
indicators such as infant mortality or nutritional  status are examples  of non-monetary  measures.
By exploiting  differences  in policy across time or space, econometric  techniques  are used to
estimate the effects of public spending  programs or services on measures  of well-being  while
controlling  for other factors which could also be influencing  outcomes. Household  data are
invariably  needed to do this.
One lesson to come out of behavioral  approaches  is that behavioral responses  are
ubiquitous. Beneficiaries  and non-beneficiaries  adapt various aspects  of their behavior to the
existence  of public intervention. A further finding  has been that, although  in the aggregate the
demand for public services tends to be price inelastic, elasticities  vary across income groups
and the poor are invariably  more price responsive. This has emerged from the literature on
user fees (Gertler et al. 1987, Gertler and Glewwe 1989, Gertler and van der Gaag 1990).  A
single, static  benefit incidence  study may show (say) that the poor use public health clinics
much more than other groups.  But it will not reveal that the poor may also alter their usage
14much more than others if prices increase.  Benefit  incidence  studies ignore behavioral
responses  and may also overlook highly distributionally  non-neutral  behavioral  effects.
SOME  LIMITATIONS  OF BEHAVIORAL  APPROACHES.  The behavioral  approaches  in
general represent a more data intensive  and technologically  and methodologically  complicated
undertaking. Quite apart from these considerations,  they have some potentially  significant
drawbacks. Here I focus on two particularly  stubborn  problems: biases in estimation  and the
problem of welfare identification.
BIASES  IN ESTIMATION.  Severe difficulties  frequently  arise in obtaining unbiased
estimates  of program effects.  A fundamental  problem in evaluation  arises when the policy
measure is not exogenous,  but is correlated with the regression  error term, so that resulting
estimates  of program impacts  are biased. 4 There are various sources of such a correlation
including  simultaneity  (whereby  the policy's placement  is determined  in part by the measured
welfare indicator)  and omitted variable bias (whereby  there is some omitted  third variable
which influences  both program placement  and the welfare outcome). 5 An example of the first
would occur if a school feeding  program were started in a village  due to high undernutrition  of
children in that community. Nutritional  status then both explains the existence  of the
intervention  and is affected  by it.  Causality  goes both ways.  If, in contrast, the feeding
program has ended up in the village as a result of the efforts of a local NGO that is taking an
active interest in promoting  the program and is raising well-being  in the village independently
of the program, then the second source of bias will be present.  Unless  the estimation allows
15for the influence  of the NGO, it will tend to confuse impacts  due to the program itself with that
due to the NGO's activities. This issue has long been recognized  in policy evaluation,  though
its pervasiveness,  the inadequacies  of past corrective actions, and the sometimes  dramatic
consequences  for policy recommendations  have recently attracted renewed attention. 6
The problem is common. In using cross-section  household  data to model policy impacts
it can be generally  presumed  that there exist household  or regional level fixed or time-varying
effects which influence  both policy enactment  and policy outcomes. Endogeneity  of program
placement  occurs when public services are located  in response  to local community  or household
factors not accounted  for in the program's evaluation. Governments  may locate programs in
areas where they are desperately  needed or where they are sure to have high returns.  In this
case, the omitted variable is likely to be a determinant  of both the program variable and its
outcome  (the dependent  variable). It is then impossible  to sort out program impacts  from the
factors responsible  for its placement. In a recent study, Pitt et al. (1993) implement  a cross-
regional fixed-effects  methodology  for dealing with the nonrandomness  of program placement. 7
They show that the biases can be large.  To take just one example, cross-sectional  estimation,
typically  used in evaluation  work, suggests  that family planning  facilities in Indonesia  increase
fertility.  But once the authors follow an estimation  method that allows for the fact that family
planning  facilities are deliberately  set up in high fertility areas, this finding is reversed.
A second example in which this issue arises is when welfare impacts  over time depend
heavily on initial conditions  through an endogenous  growth process and those same initial
conditions influence  the location of interventions  (Jalan and Ravallion  1996).  Failure to
measure fully the initial conditions at the time of intervention  can then severely bias
16assessments  of future program benefits. In an attempt to evaluate the household  level dynamic
effects of a poverty alleviation  program targeted  to poor areas in China, Jalan and Ravallion
(1996) find that community  level factors (such as poor social and physical infrastructure)  which
ensure that the region is included  in the target "poor areas" are also responsible  for the lower
rates of growth registered in those regions.  The positive effects on living standards of the poor
area development  program can be entirely obscured if this dependence  on initial conditions is
not factored into the evaluation.
Besley and Case (1994) discuss  the case where policy endogeneity  is due to political  and
economic  factors (for example changes in local political  leadership  and regional growth rates)
which vary over time as well as space.  In this case the fixed-effects  methodology  as used by
Pitt et al. (1993) does not resolve the endogeneity  problem. 8 Besley  and Case illustrate how
far wrong policy conclusions  can be despite various common  correction  techniques. They
explore the possibility  of using political  variables which influence  policies but not welfare
outcomes  as a means of identifying  policy impacts. 9
One lesson from these studies is that the undetected biases in naive methods can be
large-indeed,  large enough to induce  policymakers  to abandon  what are in effect successful
policies, and even to pursue ones which a proper investigation  would debunk." 0 Panel data
can go some way toward dealing with these problems, such as through fixed effects regression
models (Pitt et al. 1993) and dynamic  models  of household  level consumption  growth allowing
for state dependence  (Jalan and Ravallion 1996). Instrumental  variable  techniques  can also be
useful in some  cases.  An understanding  of government  budget allocation  and program
placement  rules, and of political  economy  more generally, may be fundamental  to coming to
17grips with public spending  impacts  (Besley  and Case 1994, Pitt et al. 1993). This requires
collection  of new sorts of data (such as time series of the "history" of government  policy and
of political  changes) and imaginative  ways of getting at-and  incorporating  into measurement
methodologies-the institutional  contexts within which households  and governments  make
decisions. This underlines  the need to collect and link various sources and levels of data:
household,  community,  govermment  local public finance and environmental. It is a good idea
to begin by designing  new surveys so that they fit the institutional  features of local public
finance-including the entire tax and expenditure  system-ensuring that the two complementary
sources of data can be meshed  together.  Doing so will allow data and research to better inform
public action.
Finally, using randomized  control (or experimental)  designs for evaluating certain policy
interventions  also resolves  biases due to endogeneity  problems  (discussions  are given in
Grossman 1994, Newman  et al. 1994, and Kremer 1995). However, randomly assigning
policy interventions  is not always feasible. Often too, we will also be interested  in the model
which generates  outcomes. Random assignment  methods are not useful in this case since they
only provide estimates  of mean outcomes  with and without  the intervention  and reveal little
about the underlying factors which determine  those outcomes.
IDENTIFYING  WELFARE.  Our information  on individual  and household  behavior
typically  comes from household  surveys with information  on household  characteristics  and the
consumption  of market goods. Common  practice in implementing  utility-based  measures  of
welfare is to use the survey information  to reveal preferences  and get at the underlying
18"behaviorally  consistent" indicator of well-being. For example, one approach to setting
equivalence  scales (expenditure  levels needed by households  of different sizes and demographic
compositions  to achieve the same utility) starts by estimating  a model of consumer  demand
which is used to infer the equivalence  scale.  Such welfare measures  have limitations,
particularly  when consumption  includes  publicly-provided  public and private goods.  It is now
well recognized  that demand behavior for market goods does not provide sufficient  information
for identifying  utility when-as  is invariably  the case-there  are non-market  goods which
matter to welfare (see Pollak 1991, and Browning 1992). For this reason, attempts at
constructing  welfare measures are often inadequate  or contentious. It is important  to
understand the limitations  of welfare measures  which we calculate in this way.
This problem could be avoided if the welfare indicator were directly observable. Many
studies focus on measurable  health and educational  outcomes  which implicitly  have direct
welfare significance. They econometrically  estimate a reduced form relationship  linking the
welfare indicator to inputs, including  socioeconomic  characteristics  of regions and households,
utilization and availability  of public and private services.  Unfortunately,  a direct but partial
indicator of welfare does not solve the identification  problem. Because such approaches  are not
grounded within a broader welfare framework  that would allow a valuation  of the benefits from
an improved outcome  or a public investment,  they have unclear welfare and policy
interpretations. By this approach  we learn the impact  of a given investment  on both health and
education  outcomes  (say).  In both cases public spending  may be having  considerable  impact
but we are left without a means to determine  the appropriate  tradeoffs between them.  Which
should receive priority?
19Such complications  in valuation  can be attributed  to two fundamental  problems (Comes
1995). The first is that in the real world, prices and other individual  or household
characteristics  vary across individuals. The same expenditure  level will entail a lower level of
welfare for a large household  living in a remote rural area where most prices are high than for
a small household  living in a low price region.  Secondly,  quantity  constraints  are common;
individuals  are often forced to consume  more or less than they would like because goods are
lumpy (indivisible)  or because there is rationing of some sort.  In both cases, the available
quantity  is unlikely  to equal the desired quantity. The price paid may not then reflect the true
value to the consumer. Public goods are intrinsically  lumpy. Conventional  methods assume
that each consumer  can purchase anything  she wants at prevailing  prices and budget
constraints. But under rationing, conventional  measures  of real incomes are likely to be
imperfect  measures  of welfare.  For example, a household's "real" (price and demographics-
adjusted)  income may allow it to buy the 2 breads per day it would like, but if the store rations
the household  to one bread only, then it will be worse off than another household  with the
same real income which can buy as much as it wants.  In such a case, comparisons  of pre- and
post-intervention  incomes  or consumption  expenditures  adjusted for prices may distort the
picture of what has actually happened  to welfare.
New Approaches Incorporate  Behavioral  Responses  into Incidence Studies.
So far, benefit incidence  studies and behavioral  approaches  have been discussed
separately. Why not combine the approaches? A number of recent studies can be interpreted
20as moving in that direction. These "hybrid"  approaches  do not necessarily  solve all the
problems  but they can certainly  help.
By measuring  benefits net of behavioral  responses,  the behavioral  approach tries to
determine the true impact of policy.  It often does this in the aggregate  for some
"representative  household". Regressions  predict mean outcomes. The next step is to determine
impacts  at a more dissaggregated  level and to assign those impacts  correctly in the distribution
of welfare. In other words, the aim is to make policy impacts  afunction of household
characteristics,  including income, not just control for them.  If this can be done then the
behavioral  approach can also reveal the incidence  of benefits.
A series of recent studies illustrate  how econometrically  estimated  parameters and
simnulation  techniques  allow what are basically  benefit incidence  studies to be modified so as to
incorporate incentive  effects and better estimate the distribution  of a policy's net benefits across
households. None of these studies attempts  to look at all the potential  behavioral effects or
second-round  effects, focusing instead  on a specific  parameter which is deemed to be the most
crucial  behavioral response  in the particular policy circumstances. Thus, although  these efforts
represent  an important  first step in understanding  how behavioral  responses  may alter a policy's
fiscal incidence, their results cannot be considered  as providing  conclusive  evidence on the
specific  policies examined.
Labor supply responses  to interventions  are often a concern for policymakers. The poor
care about their leisure.  However, if a policy is aiming to maximize income gains to the poor
for a given budget, labor supply  responses  are going to be an important  factor to look at.  One
recent study examines  how the labor supply  of beneficiaries  responded  to Sri Lanka's food
21stamp scheme and the implications  for the scheme's net transfers (Sahn and Alderman 1995).
Labor supply is modelled  and the parameters  used to simulate  the counterfactual  of what labor
market effort, and hence incomes,  would have been had the food stamp program not existed.
Receiving  the food-stamp  is estimated  to have reduced work by as much as 3 days per month
for men and women in rural areas corresponding  to around 30 percent of the gross transfer
from the scheme.
It has been claimed that the behavior of nonbeneficiaries  may also influence  a policy's
net impact.  For example, in many societies  and, in particular, in poor developing  countries
there is an active "moral economy"  among subgroups  of households;  group members share
risks and redistribute in favor of the poor.  But households  who are helping less well-off
relatives or other group members  may stop doing so if the government  introduces schemes to
aid households. Cox and Jimenez (1995)  look at this issue and provide another example of an
attempt to assess how behavioral  responses  may alter a policy's final distributional  impact.
The determinants  of net inter-household  transfers  received in the absence of public intervention
in the Philippines  are estimated  and predicted  parameters used to simulate the likely private
transfer response  to government  redistributive  programs.  The results suggest that public
provision  of social security may displace  the private moral economy  that exists between
households  in the Philippines.
A study of a public employment  program aimed at reducing  poverty in India attempts to
estimate the income forgone by participants  in order to participate (Datt and Ravallion 1994;
Ravallion  and Datt 1995).  This is a cost of participation  which must clearly be netted out from
the benefits to get at the actual impact  of the scheme on poverty. But this is rarely done.  The
22study aims to estimate the counterfactual  of what participants  would have been doing had they
not been working on the public employment  program.  Household  level data for two villages
are used to estimate a time allocation  model which predicts the time the household  devoted to
various activities  as a function of the employment  scheme and other exogenous  variables.
Tests are made for exogeneity  of public employment. This model is then used to simulate the
time displacement  due to the scheme. The income losses are valued to see what the cost of
participation  was and how its distribution  alters the scheme's impact. The costs are found to
be around 25 percent of gross wage earnings from the scheme.
A somewhat  different example is given by a study which explores how the gains from
an expansion  of irrigation infrastructure  in Viet Nam are likely to be distributed  given
household  and region specific  characteristics  (van de Walle 1996a, 1996b). Crop incomes are
modelled  with special emphasis  on the marginal impacts  of irrigated and non-irrigated  land for
different types of households  in different regions. The results are then used to simulate  the
potential  size and cross-household  distribution  of gains  from investments  in irrigation.  The
marginal effects of irrigation on crop incomes are found to vary with household  demographics,
education  and region of residence. Together with the existing distribution  of irrigated and non-
irrigated land across households,  these factors are shown to have significant  influence  on the
incidence  of benefits and the distributional  impacts  of a program of irrigation  expansion." 12
These studies demonstrate  that it is feasible  to incorporate  behavioral  responses into the
analysis of the incidence  of public spending. They also indicate that the effects can be quite
pronounced. There is bound to be much more empirical  research of this type in the near
future.  In addition  to the important  caveats concerning  policy endogeneity  and the
23identification  of true welfare effects, another warning  concerns the use of simulations. In all
the studies discussed, simulation  techniques  are used to draw out behavioral  implications.
These may dictate that new assumptions  be introduced. Naturally, care must be taken that such
assumptions  do not in turn feed into the results and ultimately  the conclusions  from the studies.
BEHAVIORAL  RESPONSES  IN SUM. There is incontrovertible  evidence that the
behavior  of beneficiaries  and non-beneficiaries  responds in all sorts of ways to public
interventions. But there is a need to understand  when ignoring behavioral  responses  will matter
most.  It should not automatically  be assumed that more complicated  models will produce
better or fundamentally  different policy advice. Rather little is known about how much
difference  behavioral responses  can make to key policy conclusions. At a quite general level,
more research is needed to determine  whether they do or not, so as to guide "rules of thumb"
found in practice.
In a specific  country, it will clearly not be feasible  to launch  careful, rigorous, impact
evaluations  and complicated  econometric  or randomized  assignment  methods  for each new
public policy and program initiative  or reform.  A partial reliance on 'quick and dirty"
methods, such as benefit incidence  studies, is likely to be necessary for quite some time.  Yet,
while we remain substantially  ignorant about the policy implications  of behavioral responses
and other second round effects, periodic investigations  of the more full blown behavioral  and
other effects can have high payoffs. These methods  can provide an important  reality check and
contribute to a much richer and honest perspective  on the consequences  of policy changes for
various aspects  of living standards.
24Conclusions
Public spending  policies  are continually  being enacted and reformed based on
assessments  of their effects on poverty and inequality  in living standards. This paper has
surveyed  the methods most typically  used to evaluate the distributional  impacts  of public
expenditures. In representing  the current state of the art, the paper has attempted  to identify
some of its limitations  and draw implications  for best practice.
Evaluating a policy's impact  requires assessing  how different things would have been in
its absence. However, the counterfactual  of no intervention  is often tricky to quantify
precisely. Benefit incidence  studies ignore behavioral  responses  and second round effects, and
simply  use the cost of provision  as a proxy for benefits received. Behavioral  approaches
present quite different drawbacks  in their attempts at representing  individual  benefits correctly.
Recent studies attempt to incorporate  behavioral  responses  into incidence  assessments.
However, uncertainty  remains about whether behaviorally  consistent  methods actually point to
fundamentally  different  policy recommendations. What can be concluded  is that we need to
diversify and compare results from our evaluation  methods  and broaden our definition  of well
being to see how various facets of living standards are affected.
25Notes
1.  On the "welfarist"  versus "non-welfarist"  distinction, see Sen 1979.
2.  In terms of the three conceptualizations  of welfare discussed  earlier, benefit incidence
analysis is squarely focused  on the income  dimension  alone.
3.  Such a policy can be interpreted as a way of making credit markets work better.
4.  To obtain  unbiased estimates  of the parameters in a regression  model-giving the
outcome variables  as a function of various explanatory  variables-one  requires that the latter
variables are not correlated with the regression's error term, embodying  measurement  error
in the dependant  variable and omitted  variables.
5.  Pointing to its many possible  sources, Deaton (1995 pp 1832-33)  summarizes  the problem
thus: "...when we want to estimate the effects of a policy or a project, we must take into
account  what determines it, and having done so, we will usually find that we cannot discover
its effects by standard regressions. The basic issue here is the correlation of explanatory
variables with the error term, and it matters less whether we think of that correlation as
coming from simultaneity,  heterogeneity,  selection,  or omitted variables." In all these cases,
the exogeneity  assumption  does not hold.
6.  Meyer (1995) and Besley  and Case (1994) discuss  these issues and scrutinize some of the
recent policy evaluation  analysis  for developed  countries.  Pitt et al. (1993), Jalan and
Ravallion  (1996), McKeman (1996), and Pitt and Khandker (1996) are examples  of recent
studies which discuss and attempt  to deal with biases in estimation  of policy impacts due to
various forms of endogeneity  in developing  country applications. Strauss  and Thomas (1995)
review attempts to circumvent  such biases in the context of estimating  program effects on
health and education  outcomes  in poor countries.
7.  The fixed-effects  technique  exploits  the availability  of multiple observations  over time to
rid variables of any time-invariant  (fixed)  characteristics  which influence  both policies and
their outcomes.
8.  The fixed-effects  methodology  may have other drawbacks. For example, if variation
over time contains a lot of measurement  error, eliminating  the fixed-effects  creates another
problem-namely that changes over time are now heavily contaminated  by measurement  error
(including  in explanatory  variables)  thus biasing estimates  (Deaton 1995).
9.  The political variables then act as instruments  for the policies; in the regression  of
welfare outcomes  on policies, the actual policies  are then replaced by their predicted values
obtained  by first regressing  on the political  variables.
10.  Besley  and Case (1994) illustrate in the context of workers' compensation  benefits.  The
debate between Hanushek (1995)  and Kremer (1995)  on estimations  of the effectiveness  of
26education spending, impacts  on outcomes, and what policy conclusions  to draw, provides
another interesting  example.
11.  For example, marginal gains from irrigated land are found to be higher for educated
households. The fact that education  tends to be higher in (poorer)  North Viet Nam as well
as more equitably  distributed  there, influences  the progressivity  of benefit incidence (van de
Walle 1996b). A conventional  benefit incidence  study would have typically  assumed
marginal benefits to be constant and hence, would have underestimated  the potential
progressivity  of irrigation  expansion.
12.  Note that the income gains from irrigation  are unlikely  to be reaped currently. Cross-
sections survey households  in different  long run situations. That variation is used to infer
effects of a policy which may take a long time to occur.  Irrigation benefits may not be
immediate  but the methodology  cannot reveal when they will occur.  This is a general
problem in interpreting  the implications  from static models.
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